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WHOSE CONCEPTION OF INSURANCE? 
STEVEN M. KLEPPER† 
In response to Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013). 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Abraham’s new Article, Four Conceptions of Insurance,1 offers an 
invaluable overview and critique of four modern conceptions of insurance. 
He cautions that “the particular lens through which we view insurance law 
cannot tell us what principles should govern or what policy choices to 
make.”2 But who is the “we” in that statement? This Response focuses on 
three overlooked groups with an important interest in such governing 
principles and policy choices. First, Abraham mentions insurance brokers 
only briefly, describing how large insurance brokers can negotiate policy 
terms.3 But brokers, large and small, play an important role in deciding 
which available insurance a policyholder purchases. Second, any discussion 
of homeowners insurance should include mortgage holders, who require 
mortgagors to purchase insurance and whose interest in the scope of 
coverage is equal to or greater than the homeowner’s. Third, within the 
construction industry, general contractors seek to transfer risk to their 
subcontractors, who must purchase liability policies naming general contractors 
 
† Steven M. Klepper is a principal at Kramon & Graham, P.A., in Baltimore, Maryland, where 
his practice focuses on general appellate litigation and insurance coverage. The views expressed in 
this Response are his alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of his firm or its clients. 
1 Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013). 
2 Id. at 698. 
3 Id. at 660. 
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as “additional insureds.” The contract model, which looks to the intent of 
the insurer and the subcontractor, as expressed in the policy language, 
preserves the expectations of the parties to the contract. In examining each 
of these three overlooked groups’ interests in an insurance transaction, we 
may discover that the contract model, so frequently maligned in the aca-
demic literature,4 is not so bad after all.  
I. INSURANCE BROKERS 
An insurance broker is an independent middleman who acts as the poli-
cyholder’s agent in placing insurance coverage.5 The broker, whose compen-
sation comes from commissions on policy premiums, often is identified on 
the policy’s declarations page.6 A broker’s role and interest in an insurance 
transaction should influence our view of insurance. 
Abraham, in his discussion of the contractual conception, notes that 
“[f]or sizable businesses and other institutions, contractual intent and 
understanding are potentially more plausible and meaningful notions. 
These entities have access to attorneys and insurance brokers to advise 
them.”7 Nevertheless, Abraham opines that the “notion of contractual intent 
is often problematic,” observing that, in his experience, “commercial 
policyholders’ own ‘experts’ frequently are not conversant with many of the 
terms of the numerous insurance policies that their . . . clients purchase.”8  
From my own anecdotal experience, that observation, although some-
times true, is overbroad. It rarely applies to industry-specific brokers. For 
most any construction trade in a particular region, there are insurance 
brokers who know their clients’ businesses and insurance needs. An insurer 
looking to enter that market must do so through those brokers, who can 
wield enormous influence. They can advocate particular endorsements to 
broaden coverage beyond the standard commercial general liability (CGL) 
policy, and they can resist endorsements designed to narrow coverage. 
Just as Abraham necessarily relied on his personal experience, I have no 
citations to support my observations. It is important for lawyers to remem-
ber, though, that they rarely receive a call when the policyholder has clearly 
purchased the correct coverage for its loss. And there are some objective 
 
4 See, e.g., id. at 667-68. 
5 Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. 
L.J. 1, 5 (2004); Colin Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability: Crossing the Two 
Way Street, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 237, 240 (2002). 
6 Richmond, supra note 5, at 6-7. 
7 Abraham, supra note 1, at 660. 
8 Id. at 660-61. 
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markers of brokers’ sophistication and leverage in insurance transactions. On 
the 2012 Fortune 500 list, the nation’s two largest insurance brokers, Marsh & 
McLennan Companies and Aon, ranked 2319 and 235,10 respectively—higher 
than all but a handful of casualty insurers.  
Broker expertise does not just aid large corporate policyholders. Objec-
tive evidence indicates that small brokers’ expertise collectively gives 
individual consumers leverage in the scope of coverage under homeowners 
policies. Professor Daniel Schwarcz, one of the few academics studying the 
role of brokers in the insurance marketplace, has concluded that broker 
commission systems do not do enough to steer clients toward cost-efficient 
coverage.11 But his research indicates that brokers do aid homeowners in 
selecting broader coverage, even if he believes that brokers do not do 
enough. In a recent article, Schwarcz demonstrates that, contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, the terms of homeowners policies differ considerably from 
one insurer to the next.12 The breadth of coverage often turns on who places 
the coverage: captive insurance agents, who are authorized to sell only one 
insurer’s policies, or independent brokers. Specifically, Schwarcz found that 
“the carriers who employ the least generous policy forms disproportionately 
use captive agents to distribute their policies, whereas the companies with 
unusually generous policies tend to rely on independent agents.”13 This 
research indicates that independent brokers, working on behalf of policyhold-
ers, collectively can broaden the scope of coverage under homeowners 
policies, or at least resist the narrowing of coverage. 
The value of broker expertise is not measured merely by the ability to 
negotiate the scope of coverage under a particular policy. Rather, brokers 
who understand their clients’ needs can aid them in purchasing all of the 
 
9 See Fortune 500: 231. Marsh & McLennan, CNNMONEY (May 21, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2012/snapshots/2402.html. 
10 See Fortune 500: 235. Aon, CNNMONEY (May 21, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/ 
fortune/fortune500/2012/snapshots/2430.html.  
11 See Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” in Consumer 
Insurance Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 723, 726 (2009) (“[I]nsurers who rely on independent 
agents to sell consumer lines of insurance should be prohibited from paying different rates of 
compensation to different agents for the sale of the same line of insurance.”); Daniel Schwarcz, 
Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 289, 
293-94 (2007) (“[A] disclosure requirement in consumer insurance markets is unlikely to address 
meaningfully the core risk of contingent commissions—the potential for inefficient steering.”). 
12 Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 
1266 (2011). 
13 Id. at 1277. 
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appropriate policies or coverages. Most standard CGL exclusions corre-
spond to other coverages available for purchase by the insured. Exclusions 
for injuries “arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render profes-
sional services” reflect that “professionals customarily have or are supposed 
to have professional liability insurance, so that their services should not also 
be covered by their general liability carrier.”14 Similarly, the CGL exclusion 
for property damage to personal property in the care, custody, or control of 
the insured corresponds to first-party inland marine coverage for insureds 
who handle third parties’ chattel.15 
These coverages generally are not intended to overlap. If the broker 
purchases multiple primary-layer policies applying to the same risk, then it 
is not doing right by its policyholder. Primary-layer insurance carries higher 
premiums than higher-layer excess or umbrella insurance.16 If an insured 
wants additional coverage for a particular risk, it is far more economical to 
purchase an excess or umbrella policy. 
Just as a good broker can bring great value to policyholders, there are 
legal remedies for a broker’s deficient performance. When a policy fails to 
provide the coverage that the policyholder thought it purchased, the 
policyholder frequently will look to the broker to address that shortfall.17 
And, although the default rule is that brokers have no duty to advise their 
clients regarding their insurance needs, brokers in some circumstances may 
assume (expressly or impliedly) such a duty.18 The policyholder may fare 
better in court against the broker than against the insurer if reading the 
policy would have disclosed a gap in coverage. In many jurisdictions, the 
failure to read a policy is not a defense in a failure-to-procure action against 
the broker, if the policyholder can establish reasonable reliance on the broker’s 
 
14 Harbor Ins. Co. v. Omni Constr., Inc., 912 F.2d 1520, 1521, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
15 See Customized Distribution Servs. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 862 A.2d 560, 561-63 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2004) (noting that the insured “obtained the [warehouseman’s liability] coverage to 
fill the gap created by the ‘care, custody, and control exclusion’ contained in the CGL policy”). 
16 See Scott M. Seaman & Charlene Kittredge, Excess Liability Insurance: Law and Litigation, 
32 TORT & INS. L.J. 653, 657 (1997) (“The premium paid by the insured for each successive layer 
of coverage is usually proportionately less expensive than for the immediately underlying layer.”). 
17 See generally 1 ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESEN-
TATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 6:44, at 494 (3d ed. 1995) (“[I]f a 
policy does not provide the coverage that the insured hired the broker to obtain, and the broker 
does not apprise the insured of that fact, the insured may have a remedy against the broker for the 
equivalent of the missing policy benefit in the event of a later occurrence that was supposed to 
have been, but was not, covered.”). 
18 Richmond, supra note 5, at 26 & nn.194-96, 27 & n.197. 
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expert review of the policy.19 There is insurance available for the breach of a 
broker’s duties—a broker’s own errors-and-omissions liability insurance.20  
To me, then, two propositions seem clear. First, brokers have the obliga-
tion to know the coverage they place. Second, when brokers meet that 
obligation, they can exercise great influence over whether their clients have 
coverage for losses when they arise. Critics of the contract model protest 
that brokers regularly fail to meet this threshold obligation. Whether or not 
that perception is accurate, a broker’s undereducation does not mean that 
his client lacks bargaining power. Rather, it indicates that the broker has 
failed to exercise his client’s bargaining power. It seems quite a leap, then, 
to require an insurer to provide coverage where a careful review of the 
policy would have shown no coverage.21 A reasonable observer could 
conclude instead that policyholders and state regulators should take a 
greater interest in brokers’ “trustworthiness and competence.”22  
II. MORTGAGE HOLDERS 
Abraham addresses homeowners policies in some detail, but he only 
briefly mentions mortgage holders.23 Mortgagees have just as much eco-
nomic interest as do homeowners in the scope of coverage for property 
losses. The Federal Reserve Board estimates that, as of the first quarter of 
2013, owners hold approximately 49.2% equity in their household real 
 
19 See id. at 43-45 (surveying the law regarding policyholders’ duty to read their policies). 
20 See generally Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Insurance Agents’ and Brokers’ Professional 
Liability Insurance, 55 A.L.R.5th 681 (1998) (providing an overview of coverage issues under such 
professional liability policies). 
21 Compare Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970) (“The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and 
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though 
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.”), with Wilkie 
v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 783 (Mich. 2003) (“Whether Professor Keeton 
intended this analysis to spawn a frontal assault on the ability of our citizens to manage, by 
contract, their own affairs, it had that effect because numerous courts, to one degree or another, 
adopted some form of the rule.”). 
22 See Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 450 (1946) (endorsing the requirement that a 
surplus line broker’s license issue only after a finding of “trustworthiness and competence” by the 
state insurance commissioner as “an appropriate means of safeguarding the public against the 
obvious evils arising from the lack of those qualifications”). 
23 Compare Abraham, supra note 1, at 663, 676-78 (discussing first-party homeowners coverage), 
with id. at 677 (briefly mentioning the relationship between mortgages and construction loans). 
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estate,24 meaning that mortgagees hold a slight majority of equity. No one 
would contend that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or the nation’s large banks lack 
bargaining power. Any conceptual model for property insurance should account 
for the prominent interest that mortgagees hold in the scope of coverage. 
The prevalence of homeowners insurance is owed to the fact that mort-
gage holders require homeowners to carry such insurance.25 The Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), in setting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
guidelines for purchasing mortgages on the secondary market, heavily 
influences the terms of homeowner mortgages,26 including requirements for 
homeowners insurance.27 FHFA requires insurance “against loss or damage 
from fire and other hazards”—such as “wind, civil commotion (including 
riots), smoke, hail, and damages caused by aircraft, vehicle, or explosion”—
“covered by the standard extended coverage endorsement.”28 
Since before Fannie Mae’s creation in 1938,29 property insurance policies 
have contained standard clauses giving mortgagees certain rights.30 As these 
clauses have developed, a mortgagee is not within the definition of “the 
 
24 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS 
109 tbl.B.100 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf. 
25 See Kenneth S. Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market Inefficiencies in the 
Purchase and Sale of Residential Property Insurance, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 345, 351 (2011) 
(noting that “having a mortgage equates to having homeowner's insurance”). For a standard 
insurance clause in a California mortgage, see id. at 388, which states, “All insurance policies 
required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender’s right to disapprove 
such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or 
as an additional loss payee . . . .” (citation omitted). For a sample clause in a commercial 
mortgage, see Gary A. Goodman & Bella Shirin, Understanding Insurance Vocabulary in Loan 
Transactions, 129 BANKING L.J. 22, 48 (2012): 
All insurance policies shall be endorsed in form and substance acceptable to Agent to 
name Agent on behalf of the Banks as an additional insured, loss payee or mortgagee 
thereunder, as its interest may appear, with loss payable to Agent on behalf of the Banks, 
without contribution, under a standard New York (or local equivalent) mortgagee clause. 
26 See Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. 
ON REG. 143, 196 (2009) (discussing how government-sponsored entities like Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, prodded by congressional Democrats, were able to eliminate binding mandatory 
arbitration provisions from mortgages). 
27 Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 1316. 
28 Id. at 1317 (quoting FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 
863 ( Jan. 27, 2011), available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/sel012711.pdf). 
29 See, e.g., Raymond C. Niles, Eighty Years in the Making: How Housing Subsidies Caused the 
Financial Meltdown, 6 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 165, 168 (2010) (“In 1938, the [National Housing] Act 
created the Federal National Mortgage Association, now known as Fannie Mae, to purchase 
mortgage loans from banks and securitize them.”). 
30 See Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Bohn, 65 F. 165, 167 (8th Cir. 1894) (quoting the full text of a 
“union mortgage clause”).  
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insured,” but rather has rights as a payee.31 Under a standard mortgage clause, 
an insurer will pay an innocent mortgagee’s otherwise covered claim even if 
the policyholder breaches a condition of coverage.32 
In a well-functioning market, therefore, mortgagees’ interest in the 
scope of coverage should cause them to demand insurance policies that 
provide an economically optimal scope of coverage. As we know all too well 
from the financial meltdown of 2008, however, mortgage holders generally 
are more concerned with quickly selling mortgages on the secondary market 
than with holding on to stable income-creating mortgages. Thus, in his 
study of how certain insurers issue narrower-than-standard homeowners 
coverage, Schwarcz argues against the notion that mortgage holders “police 
against inefficient coverage restrictions.”33 Professor Kenneth Klein, in 
examining why so many homeowners policies carry insufficient policy limits, 
has described how incentives to underinsure create market inefficiencies.34 
Neither of these observations, however, applies to the scope of covered 
loss under a standard “all-risk” homeowners policy special form 3 (HO3).35 
Klein addresses the amount of money available to pay a covered loss, not 
the scope of coverage under the policy language. Schwarcz’s objection is 
that mortgage holders and government regulators have failed to prevent 
certain large national carriers from issuing policies that “are substantially worse 
than the presumptive industry default of the 1999 [Insurance Services Office] 
HO3 form.”36 
Where a policy does in fact incorporate a standard HO3 form, there is 
reason to believe that the scope of coverage under the policy language is the 
product of a reasonably well-functioning market. Standard “all-risk” home-
owners forms have been evolving over a long period of time, and a 1960s 
homeowners policy (while less detailed) is recognizable when compared to a 
 
31 See Rent-A-Car Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 148 A. 252, 254-55 (Md. 1930) 
(contrasting decisions under homeowners policies with auto insurance contract that defined 
“assured” to include lender). 
32 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §§ 65:48–65:49 
(2011); John W. Steinmetz et al., The Standard Mortgage Clause in Property Insurance Policies, 33 
TORT & INS. L.J. 81, 83 & n.11 (1997). 
33 Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 1316. 
34 See Klein, supra note 25, at 367-72. 
35 For standalone homes, the most prevalent form is the 1999 version of the HO3 form 
promulgated by the Insurance Services Office. See Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 1273, 1277. 
36 Id. at 1277, 1314-17. 
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modern policy.37 It seems unlikely that standard forms would deviate 
significantly from what mortgage holders, when paying attention, think to 
be essential terms of coverage. Viewed through that lens, the standard 
homeowners policy does not appear to be the product of unequal bargaining 
power between individual homeowners and insurers, but rather a reflection 
of the scope of coverage that mortgage holders find economically justified. 
III. GENERAL CONTRACTORS 
In the construction industry, a general contractor typically will require 
that its subcontractors’ CGL insurance policies name the general contractor 
as an “additional insured” with respect to the subcontractor’s work.38 When 
the general contractor is sued for defective construction or for on-site 
bodily injury, it typically will demand that each of its subcontractors’ 
insurers defend and indemnify it as an additional insured. 
But the subcontractor may not want its insurer to pay where coverage is 
questionable, or to pay a disproportionate share of the general contractor’s 
defense or indemnity. As one commentator has noted, “Every time his 
insurance becomes involved to defend or pay a judgment, the subcontractor 
must pay his deductible and further faces the possibility of escalating 
premiums and diluting policy limits to pay his own costs and judgments.”39 
The question of the scope of coverage for the general contractor’s claim 
goes to the very heart of insurance. The essence of an insurance contract is 
that the insured pays a premium in exchange for the insurer assuming a 
specified risk.40 While in the ordinary insurance relationship, the risk of 
increased premiums deters the insured from engaging in risky activity, “the 
additional insured is insulated against this prospect by the fact that it is not 
responsible for premium payments to the insurer and is unaffected by the 
raising of premiums.”41 
 
37 Compare Samuel v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 181 So. 2d 243, 245 (La. Ct. 
App. 1965) (quoting from standard form), with Homeowners Composite Form: Section I – Perils 
Insured Against (presenting a modern composite HO3 form), in SUSAN J. MILLER, MILLER’S 
STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED (6th ed. 2011). 
38 See generally PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND 
O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 11:151 (2013). 
39 Trisha Strode, Note, From the Bottom of the Food Chain Looking Up: Subcontractors Are Find-
ing that Additional Insured Endorsements Are Giving Them Much More than They Bargained for, 23 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 697, 698 (2004). 
40 In re Tex. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., Inc., 169 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2005) (“The payment of the 
premium by the insured and the assumption of a specified risk by the insurer are the essential 
elements of the contract of insurance.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
41 Samir B. Mehta, Comment, Additional Insured Status in Construction Contracts and Moral 
Hazard, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 169, 186-87 (1996). 
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Thus, when a dispute turns on the existence or scope of “additional 
insured” coverage, contract law looks to the intentions of the policyholder 
(who paid the premium) and of the insurer, as expressed in the language of 
the policy, not to the expectations of the putative additional insured.42 The 
contractual model of insurance thereby operates to protect the interests of 
the policyholder. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota’s recent decision in Engineering & 
Construction Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co.,43 reflects this dynamic. The 
general contractor for a sewer pipeline sued its subcontractor and the 
subcontractor’s CGL insurer for repairs that the general contractor had to 
make after one of the subcontractor’s metal sheets damaged the pipe.44 A 
jury determined that the subcontractor was not negligent,45 but the general 
contractor asserted that the subcontractor was still liable under the indemnity 
provisions of its subcontract, and that the subcontractor’s insurer was liable 
under the policy’s “additional insured” endorsement.46 The case drew a 
number of amicus curiae briefs,47 including one submitted by state and 
national subcontractors’ associations.48 That brief did not merely argue for 
the subcontractors’ position on contractual indemnity, but claimed more 
 
42 See Leamington Co. v. Nonprofits’ Ins. Ass’n, 615 N.W.2d 349, 354-55 (Minn. 2000) 
(explaining that a reformation claim by a third party asserting “additional insured” status turns on 
the intentions of the insurer and named insured); Christenberry v. Tipton, 160 S.W.3d 487, 494 
(Tenn. 2005) (commenting that “when interpreting an insurance policy, . . . a cardinal rule is that 
a court must attempt to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties”); see also One Beacon 
Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d 258, 272 (5th Cir. 2011) (parsing the language of 
the insurance policy and concluding that an unnamed third party was not an additional insured); 
WINDT, supra note 17, § 4:05, at 181 (noting that, notwithstanding the ordinary rule that the 
allegations of the underlying tort complaint control whether the liability insurer has a defense 
obligation, “[s]everal courts . . . have held that the insurer is not obligated to provide a defense for 
a stranger merely because the plaintiff alleges facts that, if true, would make the stranger an 
additional insured as defined in the policy”). 
43 825 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. 2013). 
44 Id. at 698-701. 
45 Id. at 701. 
46 Id. at 702. 
47 See Minnesota Appellate Court Issues in Briefs, MINN. ST. L. LIBR., http://mn.gov/lawlib/ 
briefs/a������sc.html (last visited Nov. �, ����) (listing the amicus briefs filed in the case). By way 
of disclosure, I authored an amicus brief for the American Insurance Association. See Brief of 
Amicus Curiae The American Insurance Ass’n, Eng’g & Constr., 825 N.W.2d 695 (No. A11-0159), 
2012 WL 7160265. 
48 See Brief of Amicus Curiae The American Subcontractors Ass’n of Minnesota & The 
American Subcontractors Ass’n, Eng’g & Constr., 825 N.W.2d 695 (No. A11-0159), 2012 WL 
7160266.  
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broadly that the insurer’s “additional insured” endorsement should be construed 
narrowly.49 The court ruled for both the subcontractor and the insurer.50 
Insurance coverage disputes do not always fit a policyholder-versus-
insurer narrative. Different insureds (or putative insureds) may ask a court to 
adopt competing interpretations of an insurance policy. A contract approach, 
which gives the words in a policy their objectively reasonable meaning, 
therefore provides the most workable means of resolving such disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
 The literature regarding alternative conceptions of insurance focuses on 
the perceived shortcomings of the contractual model.51 Examining the roles 
of brokers, mortgage holders, and general contractors, however, puts those 
critiques in a different light. Brokers have a duty to know the coverage they 
place, and they have every incentive to ensure that their clients purchase 
the appropriate range of available coverages. Given mortgage holders’ 
longstanding interest in the scope of coverage under homeowners policies, 
standard policies may be fairly close to the ideal economic balance. Disa-
greements between general contractors and subcontractors regarding the 
scope of coverage under “additional insured” endorsements demonstrate the 
value of measuring coverage by the language of the contract. Abraham’s 
article invites a dialogue about what we want from insurance, and I hope 
that the dialogue will appreciate the value of understanding who “we” are.  
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49 Id. at 15-16. 
50 Eng’g & Constr., 825 N.W.2d at 710, 714. 
51 See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 1, at 667-68. 
